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Abstract
Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory offers a framework for naturalizing subjective experi-
ences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representa-
tional contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and corre-
lated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-
naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger’s claim that his theory ren-
ders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary (I). In particular, Husserl’s phe-
nomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as uncritical and inadequate. It will be
demonstrated that this critique is misguided. (II). The main deficiencies of Metzinger’s theory
will be elucidated by referring to the conception of phenomenal transparency (III) which will
be compared to a phenomenological idea of transparency (IV). Then we shall enlarge our
critical horizon by focusing on some implications of representationalism, including reification
of consciousness, brain-Cartesianism, and exclusion of the social dimension (V). Finally, we
shall take up our meta-theoretical reflections on the naturalism debate (VI).
I. Cognitive Science versus Phenomenology:
Points of Departure
Cognitive scientists usually take for granted that it is, on principle, possible
to naturalize subjective experiences. There is much debate on the condi-
tions and possibility of this enterprise. However, there is hardly any funda-
mental doubt concerning the feasibility and adequacy of naturalization
projects. The idea of subjectivity involved in these theories mainly refers to
qualia and diverse modes of self-reference. Accordingly, a considerable
part of the debate on the prospects of naturalization programs in the field
of cognitive science focuses on the relation between presentational and
representational contents of mind, both being grasped in terms of multi-
realizable functional states.
Phenomenologists insist on the practical dimension of subjectivity and
make a point of questioning the methodical and conceptual presupposi-
tions of cognitive scientific models of the mind. From this point of view, it
is obvious that an effective refusal of strong naturalization projects which ig-
nore or distort our life-worldly experience requires more than exploring the
consistency and empirical plausibility of the theories in question. A phe-
nomenological critique of such theories transcends the limits of an imma-
nent critique, however elaborately this may be done. Therefore, the onus
rests with the phenomenologists to show that their objections cannot be
passed over lightly or ridiculed as dogmatically ignoring the efficiency of
modern natural science.
The core of what phenomenologists have to say with regard to strong pro-
jects of naturalizing the human mind is this: Refuting naturalism is tanta-
mount to appreciating the work of natural science whose impressive suc-
cess is exactly enabled by the fact that natural science, due to its methodi-
cal idealizations and specific theoretical interest, is always an undertaking
of limited scope (cf. Husserl 1962). Naturalism arises whenever this fact is
obscured, displaced or explicitly denied. Neglecting the limited scope of
scientific theories goes hand in hand with neglecting the function and sta-
tus of the subject whose experiences are the starting-point of all scientific
theorizing. It may therefore be said that self-forgetfulness is a significant
mark of the natural scientific attitude (Husserl 1952a, pp. 183–184). It
manifests itself in a strong affinity to a purely mechanical or technical ap-
proach to scientific methods. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, which claims
to go beyond traditional distinctions such as subject/object or theory/prac-
tice via an existential analysis of being-human (Dasein), represents an al-
ternative, phenomenological critique of naturalism. According to this pro-
ject, the limited scope of scientific investigations is explained by referring to
the ontological difference, i.e. the difference between Being (Sein) and par-
ticular spheres of entities (Seiendes), by querying the presuppositions im-
plied in the theoretical attitudes of science and philosophy and, more spe-
cifically, by maintaining a foundational relation between a logical idea of
science and an existential idea of science (Heidegger 2001, § 69b). If phe-
nomenologists are right in arguing that the abilities and achievements of
the subject (Husserl) or of being-human (Heidegger), genetically viewed,
underlie all scientific investigations, then it goes without saying that what is
at stake in the naturalism debate is nothing less than our idea of science. If
the exclusion of the subject or of being-human is the most fundamental ob-
jection to strong and dogmatic types of naturalism, then it seems plausible
that cognitive scientists aim at strengthening their position by demonstrat-
ing that subjective experiences can be naturalized. In reply to this, phe-
nomenologists argue that constructions of a naturalized subjectivity, again,
can be understood only by referring to a subjectivity both embedded in a
life world and not naturalized. In the following we shall confine ourselves
to a Husserlian-style, anti-naturalistic reasoning, for the naturalization pro-
ject at issue explicitly refers to Husserl’s idea of intentionality. The latter is
given prominence as the most influential old-fashioned and unscientific
model of the human mind which cognitive science is expected to overcome.
II. Husserl and Metzinger:
Two Incompatible Models of the Human Mind
Phenomenology is, basically, interested in phenomenality. It claims to grasp
phenomena, i. e. things and processes, solely with respect to their appear-
ance. For conceptual reasons, there is no phenomenon in itself. Pheno-
mena are intrinsically related to some consciousness for whom they are
presently given. According to our natural attitude, we do not encounter
phenomena but those things we are directed at for multifarious reasons,
for instance, in order to gain some knowledge about them, technically
modify them or consume them. To become aware of phenomena means to
become aware of the fact that there is an intentional structure lying be-
neath our ordinary way of handling things and looking at the world. This
awareness requires a change of attitude which involves a reflective stance.
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Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology establishes an attitude towards
attitudes (Husserl 1952a, pp. 174, 179). This higher order reflexivity can,
among other things, be directed at scientific attitudes. In this case it must
be shown that every theory is based on a specific correlation between a
method and its object of investigation. For example, natural science always
operates on the basis of a tacit agreement concerning what qualifies as na-
ture or natural object (Husserl 1952a, p. 2; Husserl 2001, p. 10). Moreover,
every theoretical attitude (including a philosophical one, cf. Husserl 1952a,
p. 146) refers to a specific theorizing subject, the latter being a methodical
fiction which must not be confused with a full-blooded human person. It
goes beyond the specific theoretical interest of natural science to dig into
these correlations of method, object and subject (cf. Husserl 1952a, pp.
287–288, 355). Phenomenology, on the other hand, is the endeavour to dis-
close the hidden structure of intentionality in a methodically disciplined
manner. It makes explicit the correlation between consciousness and world
with regard to a variety of intentional relations.
Reading works of Husserl, we constantly stumble on the term »conscious-
ness«. This might be misleading. Phenomenology is not interested in inves-
tigating consciousness as an object of scientific, e.g. psychological, concern
cutting off its relations to other regions of being. Consciousness is of philo-
sophical interest only insofar as it functions as the medium of experiences
embedded in a pre-given world. If we take consciousness in its pure inten-
tional function, leaving aside the existential assumptions we normally at-
tach to it with regard to both the experience and its object, we discover that
»pure« consciousness incorporates all other regions of being: everything
can be considered a phenomenon. Every physical or higher-order object or
process can be considered as intentionally related to consciousness.
According to Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism, pure
consciousness, which renders possible the appearance of any object what-
soever, cannot, on its turn, be conceived of as appearing in the mode of an
object. The result would otherwise be an infinite regress of consciousness,
since we would have to ask for whom this appearing consciousness-phe-
nomenon were given and so forth ad infinitum.
Phenomenologically viewed, consciousness is the place where the world is
brought to appearance. Consciousness, due to its physical foundation, al-
ways occupies a certain place within the world. On the other hand, the
world is brought to appearance by consciousness in terms of meaning consti-
tution. (A pure ego not embodied could not have any appearances.)
Husserl’s paradox of subjectivity refers to this double role of constituting
world and being part of an already constituted world. This is far from being
an artificial or purely theoretical philosophical problem. It accurately de-
scribes the fact that we experience ourselves both as self-conscious agents
and as physically pre-structured entities situated both temporally and spa-
tially (cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2003b, pp. 125–205). A phenomenological cri-
tique of naturalism is based on vigorously acknowledging the legitimate
naturalization of consciousness. This naturalization turns into a kind of na-
turalism which has to be refuted if one falsely ignores its »natural« limits
(cf. Husserl 1952a, pp. 297, 346). The latter are brought to light by analysing
the human mind as a complex phenomenon which comprises different on-
tological layers. The term »naturalization« rightly indicates the inseparabi-
lity of nature and mind in every human consciousness. Strong naturalistic
theories, on the contrary, annul the multi-layered structure of conscious-
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ness in favour of describing its physiological organization as if the achieve-
ments of consciousness could be exhaustively grasped by confining oneself
to its physiological foundation.
Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory takes notice of the physiological
conditions which give rise to those occurrences we are accustomed to name
»consciousness«. His neurophenomenology (Metzinger 1999b, p. 392) is
meant to replace traditional phenomenology. It claims to give a naturalistic
reformulation of subjectivity centring round phenomenal consciousness and
cognitive self-reference. Metzinger’s intention is not to eliminate subjectiv-
ity. Instead, he wants to take our first-person perspective seriously (cf.
Metzinger 1999a, p. 9). Describing phenomena such as experiencing sensa-
tional contents, remembering, focusing one’s attention on something or
behaving like a self-conscious agent, Metzinger assumes that the represen-
tational contents of the mind are correlated with brain activities. Because
this correlation is interpreted in terms of supervenience, the author be-
lieves his theory offers a non-reductive naturalization of the human mind.
In particular, its naturalistic character is said to consist in treating con-
sciousness in all its manifestations as a natural phenomenon which can be
explained by natural means in reference to natural history (Metzinger 1994,
pp. 42–43; Metzinger 1999a, pp. 18, 23–24, 117, 229). If we follow Metz-
inger in equating naturalistic theories with empirically founded theories, we
are dealing with a weak and trivial conception of naturalism. Looking for
more substantial statements, we learn that there are two which, according
to Metzinger, are essential to naturalistic theories. Theories of this kind
refuse both the idea of material a priori knowledge and the subject/object
distinction as a basic category of our theorizing about the human mind.
The former moment manifests itself in a bottom-up analysis that explains
structural and procedural features of consciousness as resulting from self-
organizing processes. These processes may be said to stand without need of
any non-inherently functioning principles of regulation and control. When
Metzinger argues in favour of his naturalistic theory, he proceeds from the
alternative naturalism vs. essentialism (sc. metaphysics) or metaphysics of
subject vs. self-organizing natural systems. He ignores the fact that a pheno-
menological approach cannot be subsumed under this alternative. Rather,
it gets all its impulse and vigour from the attempt to open up a third way
between naturalism and essentialism. This third way rests on the attempt to
faithfully and painstakingly describe our lived experience.
Metzinger is not concerned with philosophically querying phenomenality in
accordance with Husserl’s First Philosophy. He does not take a phenome-
nological point of view according to which consciousness is considered the
general medium of appearance. Consciousness, rather, is subject to a spe-
cial methodical grip which replaces its intentional structure by internally
produced hierarchies of informational data. These data are investigated
with a view to their physical realization. Metzinger’s project of presenting
an empirically corroborated theory of the human mind is composed of a
naturalization of qualia and a naturalization of intentionality. In his theory,
»phenomenal consciousness« both refers to Qualia and to those operations
which engender a phenomenal ego. As for the latter, it is particularly the
sub-symbolic constitution of the phenomenal attribute of subject-centring
which is of theoretical interest. Qualia are sensational contents whose
quality seems to exclude any objective description, for the specific mode of
being given to someone is constitutive of the quality at issue (cf. Metzinger
2000b). Qualia are considered simple, indivisible mental states possessing a
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peculiar phenomenal content, namely »a subjective quality of experiencing
which is accessible only to the person who has the experience in question«
(Metzinger 1996a, p. 323). According to a phenomenological approach,
»phenomenal consciousness« refers to two associated aspects of intentio-
nal experiences, namely: a) the appearing of x, and b) the present, living-
through of the experience directed at x. Consequently, intentionality and
phenomenality cannot be discussed separately. Contrary to this, Metzinger
takes intentionality and phenomenality as representing two issues which
can be treated independently from one another.
Metzinger holds that the representational character of contents is exclu-
sively grounded in the causal roles which these contents fulfil as parts of an
information processing system. Representation, therefore, is not an intrin-
sic character of contents of a special kind. Rather, representation has a
functional role. The fundamental difference between Metzinger’s concept
of representation and the phenomenological concept of intentionality may
be summarized as follows.
i) Information flows into the system from outside. Information processing,
therefore, is referred to as »inverted intentionality« (Metzinger 1999a, pp.
128–129). The cognitive scientific concept of representation is based on the
assumption that there are causal relations holding between an information
processing system and its environment. According to a phenomenological
concept of intentionality, intentional and real relations are irreducibly dif-
ferent insofar as the former may not be explained by referring to the latter.
Of course, causal relations can concomitantly occur with intentional rela-
tions, for instance in the case of sensual perception. Nevertheless, inten-
tional relations constitute a meaning content which cannot be reduced to
physical or physiological issues, e.g. relations of stimuli and reaction.
ii) The phenomenological concept of intentionality combines two aspects,
namely the directedness to an object, via some intentional content, and an
immediate awareness of my actually living through the intentional experi-
ence in question. Metzinger eliminates the latter moment in favour of a
conception that integrates phenomenal states into a self-model and a world-
model by means of self-referentially structured meta-representations. Self-
models occur whenever a part of the system analogically represents the system
as a whole. Self-models do not involve any propositionally structured self-
reference. Those parts of self-models which, in principle, can be represented
as contents of phenomenal consciousness, via some meta-representation, are
called »mental«. A phenomenal self is that part of the mental self-model
which is the actual content of phenomenal consciousness (Metzinger 1999a,
pp. 158–159). Subjectivity is a quality of complex information processing sys-
tems which manifests itself if and only if the system succeeds in embedding a
self-model into its model of reality (Metzinger 1999a, p. 204).
The cognitive scientific conception of representation rests on a dual struc-
ture of internal data-processing and outer reality, one which is induced by
Metzinger’s concept of information. It implies a third-person perspective.
The basic concepts of Metzinger’s theory presuppose what this theory claims
to show, namely that it is possible to naturalize our folk-psychological ac-
count of first-person perspective. A human first-person perspective pre-
cisely manifests itself in the intrinsic relatedness of consciousness and
world, the latter being interpreted in terms of meaningful experiences. Due
to its conceptual and methodical framework, Metzinger’s self-model theory
cuts off this intimate relation between consciousness and world. Metzinger
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refutes Husserl’s (and every other »classical«) conception of intentionality.
In doing so, he ignores that a phenomenologist’s and a cognitive scientist’s
idea of consciousness radically differ from each other. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that he considers Husserl’s phenomenological idealism an incom-
prehensible and obscure position. Among other things, Metzinger’s cri-
tique is misguided with regard to the following issues.
• According to Metzinger, intentional experiences are present whenever an
act (noesis) is directed to an intentional content (noema) as its object. In
this view the mediating function of intentional contents gets lost. Whereas
Husserl emphasizes that intentional contents are not the objects of our
concern whenever we live through present intentional experiences (al-
though we can turn our attention to them in subsequent acts of reflec-
tion), Metzinger implicitly takes this reflective turn to be constitutive of
the »naïvely« realized intentional relation. From the point of view of phe-
nomenology, this amounts to reifying intentional contents and conscious-
ness respectively, since the fundamental reality of accomplishment (Vollzug),
that is, of performing intentional experiences, is eliminated. Metzinger,
however, denies any reifying interpretation.
»Content is not a mysterious type of thing, but an abstract property of a highly fluid and com-
plex cognitive dynamics …« (Metzinger 2000a, p. 302 (fn. 3)).
Representational contents must be described as
»… an aspect of an ongoing process and not as some kind of abstract object«. (Metzinger
2003b, p. 358)
• According to Husserl, intentional contents are both aspects of an ongoing
process of experiencing and abstract objects, depending on whether they
are considered as actually functioning or referred to by means of reflec-
tive acts (noematic reflection). Holding this view, requires, of course, that
we note Husserl’s purely formal understanding of object: »everything
upon which we may predicate«. It furthermore requires us to acknowl-
edge that living through actual experiences and reflecting on experiences
are fundamentally different act qualities and that reflection presupposes
actual experience. If we talk about a »mediating function« of intentional
contents, this refers to the fact that every reference to an object involves
some intentional content which determines the reference at issue. The re-
latedness of consciousness and world, if analysed theoretically, shows itself
to be realized by means of these contents. This obviously does not involve a
noematic mediator in accordance with the idea that consciousness and
world are separate spheres of reality in need of being brought together by
some ontologically mysterious noema entity representing an »outer real-
ity«. This view certainly does not correspond to our experience of being
intentionally related to something. In other words: it is ontologically and
epistemologically harmless to refer to a mediating function of intentional
contents, if this is interpreted in terms of the above mentioned one-sided
genetic dependence of acts of reflection upon preceding accomplish-
ments. Acknowledging the mediating function of intentional content is equi-
valent to denying the representational character of our intentional relations.
• Phenomenology does not replace real objects with intentional objects.
Distinguishing intentional objects from real ones neither implies nor re-
quires that we consider the former as fictitious. On the other hand, if in-
tentional experiences are conceived of as functional states which repre-
sent aggregates of causal relations, we should say that intentional contents
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represent presently given objects because mental states are determined by
something different from them and located outside them (Metzinger
1999a, p. 17). However, in cases of remembering, imagining future events,
fantasies, hallucinations and similar mental phenomena (»mental simula-
tions«), it is obvious that there is no represented object as part of the pres-
ent environment (cf. Metzinger 1999a, p. 66). Following Metzinger, there-
fore, we have to interpret intentional experiences on a large scale as fanta-
sies which are not caused by any external occurrences.
• A phenomenological conception of intentionality does not assume a privi-
leged first-person accessibility in terms of a full self-referential transpar-
ency of consciousness. Arguing like this is based on a dogmatic idea of
givenness and a misguided conception of inner certainty (cf. Rinofner-
Kreidl 2000, pp. 178–203; 387–412).
III. A Scientific Model of Phenomenal Transparency:
the Illusive Self
Phenomenal transparency (PT) is one of the basic features of the human
mind. Transparency is a property of phenomenal representations in a sub-
symbolic medium, i. e. of non-linguistic entities (Metzinger 2003b, p. 363).
It is »a property of active mental representations satisfying the minimally
sufficient constraints for conscious experience to occur« (Metzinger 2003b,
p. 355), namely being presently activated and being integrated in a global
model of the world.
»[Phenomenally] transparent representations are precisely those representations the exis-
tence of whose content we cannot doubt.« (Metzinger 2003c, p. 563)
PT is important with respect to explaining the achievement of cognitive
self-reference that always is reference to the phenomenal content of a
transparent self-model (Metzinger 2003b, p. 385). Why do transparent
states emerge in information processing systems?
»(W)hat makes mental representations transparent is the attentional unavailability of earlier
processing stages in the brain for introspection.« (Metzinger 2003b, p. 356)
PT is problematic with regard to its epistemological implications. PT is
meant to elucidate a thesis which may be designated the »illusion thesis«
(IT): The subjectivity of the mental results from a kind of self-confusion. A
phenomenal ego appears because the system, in a certain respect, is de-
prived of information. This possibly is the most important insight of cogniti-
ve science concerning philosophical anthropology (Metzinger 1998, p. 361).
We may expound this insight as follows:
(IT) The unity of our phenomenal self is a representational fiction (Metzin-
ger 1996b, p. 152). The fact that we are faced with a fiction cannot be reali-
zed at the phenomenal, personal level of consciousness (Metzinger 2003b,
p. 363; Metzinger 1994, pp. 50–51). Semantic transparency is responsible
for our pre-reflexive self-acquaintance (Metzinger 1998, p. 360): A phe-
nomenal first-person perspective emerges whenever a system is not able to
recognize its self-model as a model. Only from the point of view of sub-
personal information processing, it is possible to recognize the illusion and
to explain why it necessarily occurs, given information processing systems
of a certain complexity. Cognitive science helps us to understand why phe-
nomenologists inevitably fall victim to the myth of the given. What pheno-
menologists naïvely grasp as immediately given truly is a construction ba-
sed on neural processes.
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The argument in favour of IT may be expounded in the following manner.
What, in everyday experience, is given to us immediately, is interpreted in
a naïvely realistic mode. Under normal conditions, we have the strong, al-
beit subjective, feeling that we are in direct contact with both ourselves as
experiencing subjects and with the world. From a scientific point of view, it
turns out that what presents itself as immediately given actually results
from the inability of human consciousness to simultaneously grasp those
rapidly running off brain processes that lie behind the experiences in ques-
tion (cf. Metzinger 1999b, p. 401). As soon as we come to know this time
lag inherent in all our thinking, perceiving, remembering or desiring, we
cannot stick to the former naïvely realistic interpretation of ourselves and
the world. As Metzinger argues, with a view to the Cotard syndrome, this
implies that »if a human being’s self-model became fully opaque, then this
person would experience herself as non-existent« (Metzinger 2003f, p. 21).
Abandoning naïve realism, we recognize that what actually happens when
we live through theoretical and practical intentions is that some special sys-
tem operations occur. Strictly speaking, there is no intention directed to an
object »out there«. There is rather an informational process taking place.
Intentional relations are substituted by an internal determinism of the in-
formation processing system. Metzinger’s representationalism implies a
constructivistic bias which cannot be challenged within the framework of
his theory (cf. Metzinger 1996a, p. 622).
According to Metzinger, traditional theories of intentionality hold an inco-
rrect idea of how the mental modelling of representational relations takes
place. They erroneously attribute intentional experiences to a phenomenal
self-model instead of attributing them to the brain that engenders the self-
model in question. Referring to the latter, we do not find individual causal
relations. A self-model exclusively grasps the final products of these under-
lying processes. From this Metzinger draws the conclusion that there is no
consciousness which is directed to the world. There are, rather, complex
physical occurrences determining mental models (Metzinger 1999a, pp.
128–129 (fn. 212)). This amounts to a naturalization of the cogito. Whereas
Descartes took our thinking to be inseparable from our ego, we realize
nowadays that, according to Metzinger, the ego is nothing but a thought
which depends on a physical system thinking this thought. This system, for
instance the brain of a biological organism, is the thinking thing (Metz-
inger 1999a, pp. 154–155).
From the above, it is clear that IT requires a highly problematic supple-
mentary thesis which I call the »hidden agent thesis (HAT)«:
The true cognitive agent of our intentional experiences is not the phenomenal ego repre-
sented by a relatively stable and coherent self-model. The true agent is our brain.
Mental states do not represent their internal constructional genesis. They
lack the quality of Gewordenheit (Metzinger 1996b, p. 143). The temporal-
ity of the underlying processes does not enter the representational content.
Accordingly, IT may be reformulated as follows.
The illusive character of (at least some) representations is due to the fact that their neurologi-
cal constitution is not part of the representational contents in question.
Let us call this T1. T1 involves a fallacy of latency. In order to explain why
T1 is fallacious, we must now take up the problem of transparency as it
presents itself in non-scientific contexts.
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IV. A Phenomenological Model of Phenomenal Transparency:
the Double Aspect of a Self’s Behaviour
(Accomplishment and Reflection)
Everyday experience is acquainted with a basic transparency of values, in-
terests, purposes and so on which is indispensable for our thinking and act-
ing. Whenever these issues are made, the objects of concern two things
happen. First, they lose their immediate and reliable guiding function be-
cause we recognize that there are alternative values, interests, and pur-
poses which could or should be equally realized. Secondly, the intentional
objects of the experiences in question change as soon as we stop thinking
and acting in a »naïve« mode and start reflecting on the rationales of our
thinking and acting. Given that our hierarchies of values, interests, and
purposes cannot be absolutely justified, the above reasoning leads to this:
in order to think and act something, i.e. problematic ideas, must be kept in
latency.
On the other hand, asking whether our thoughts and actions are reasonable
involves a reflective turn. For the present purposes we may leave un-
touched what it means to give sufficient reasons for our acting and how we
could hope to practically implement our principles of acting. With a view
to the issue of transparency, it may suffice to note that in order to act
smoothly these principles have to be made our own in a manner that allows
for an »invisible« or unnoticed functioning. The fact that x functions la-
tently does not indicate that x lacks any rational foundation. It might, just
as well, turn out that it is perfectly rational to act x-like. In the absence of
any reflection, practical (as well as theoretical) transparency leaves entirely
open whether we are faced with an irrational behaviour or with a rational
one dropped into a special mode of passivity, where passivity normally in-
cludes, as Husserl says, some hidden rationality. Acknowledging latent fun-
ctions is neutral to epistemological concerns. The latter cannot be formu-
lated as long as the intentional contents in question have not been made
explicit. The occurrence of intentional experiences, as far as we know, de-
pends on various latent functions of, for instance, biological organisms.
However, describing latent functions does not mean giving a sufficient or
even relevant description of the intentional experiences, e.g. thinking about
something, whose occurrence is owing to the latent functions at issue. For
instance, it is a reasonable hypothesis worth of being empirically tested that
»… [identity] disorders, while being diagnosed on the personal level of description, result from
subpersonal disintegration« (Metzinger 2003f, p. 24).
Nevertheless, trying to explain the occurrence of pathological types of ex-
perience by referring to neurophysiological states or functional relations
taken to be realized in these states, does not and cannot help us to gain a
better, therapeutic understanding of what it means to have experiences of
these kinds.
As we have seen above, relating to the mediating function of intentional
content, there is also a transparency thesis implicit in a phenomenological
conception of intentionality. When Husserl analyses the mode of givenness
of other minds, he introduces the following analogy. The apperception of
intentional contents that I attribute to other persons’ mind is achieved via
some bodily appearance in a way similar to the apperception of meaning
which is achieved via some linguistic sign, »meaning« understood here in a
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narrow logical sense (Husserl 1952a, p. 240). My body as well as the body
of other persons functions transparently with regard to the apperception
and communication of intentional contents. The phenomenological trans-
parency thesis illustrates how phenomenologists steer clear of the alternati-
ve of a metaphysical essentialism and naturalism. Analysing the mind/body-
relation, we have to recognize that, engaged in our life-world practice, we
normally do not experience any separation of mind and body. According to
Husserl, gaining sympathetic understanding (einfühlendes Verstehen) of
other persons means to grasp their bodies with a view to inherent meaning
structures manifesting a unity of sense. Every perception of a person is
founded on an apperception of objective intentional content (objektiver
Geist). On the other hand, there is no apperception of the body as bearer
of the psychical in terms of a physical object which had to be supplemented
by something different, as if it were taken
»… as something related or connected to something else. It, rather, is a higher-level objectifi-
cation superimposing on a lower-level one to the effect that there results a unified object.
Without referring to any kind of connection which would imply separation, this synthetic object
comprises a lower- and a higher-level-constitution being distinguished only subsequently. The
unity which is given in course of apperceiving some spiritual being can be distinguished into body
and sense by changing the apperceiving attitude.« (Husserl 1952a, p. 244, emphasis mine, SR)
The so-called mind/body-problem arises if we theoretically reflect on the
possibility of apperceiving other minds. However sophisticated this reflec-
tion may be, it always refers back and remains embedded in our experien-
tial practice. Acknowledging the transparency involved in this original practice
amounts to overcoming the Cartesian starting-point of our theorizing both
with regard to the original mind/body-unity and the original community of self
and others. Phenomenologically viewed, there is no need to naturalize the
mind as long as our theoretical representations of the human mind do not
go beyond its true nature, that is as it presents itself in primordial experi-
ence, in favour of introducing some dubious spiritual entity.
The phenomenological transparency thesis differs in an essential way from
Metzinger’s transparency thesis. First, it is not connected with any illusion
thesis. If we explicitly refer to the functioning of bodily appearance and be-
haviour or linguistic signs, an act which we may accomplish at any time by
turning our attention, this does not alter the epistemic appraisal of the in-
tentional content at issue. Acknowledging the indispensability of latent
functions does not alter the phenomenal character of those previous expe-
riences that have been effected because of the latent functions in question.
Second, and in connection with the epistemic neutrality of reflecting on
transparent moments, the phenomenological transparency thesis does not
annihilate the distinction between living through experiences and reflecting
on experiences. On the contrary, phenomenological transparency implies
that this distinction essentially belongs to human consciousness. Third,
whether something is explicitly grasped or given transparently, whether it
is, to use Husserl’s terms, given in a manifest (patent) or latent manner, de-
pends on the thematic attitude of the experiencing subject. In order to un-
derstand transparency, we must inquire into the attitude object correla-
tions that belong to the intentional life of persons, instead of analysing spe-
cial attitudes, e.g. attention, in terms of information processing. In order to
distinguish latent and manifest functions, we must make reference to chang-
ing attitudes or perspectives, modes of querying. Nothing is in itself latent
or manifest. The appearance of whatever thing and moment depends on
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particular circumstances and conditions on the side of the subject, as well
as on the side of the object which must be specified. Every single attitude
brings to light particular objects and processes and, simultaneously, makes
disappear other objects and processes. For instance, if we decide to neuro-
logically inquire into the genesis of phenomenal transparency, we unavoid-
ably lose out of sight the intentional life of persons. IT forfeits its prima
facie-plausibility if we realize that every scientific finding rests on some
particular attitude which fulfils a visualizing and de-visualizing function in
the above sense. This function is vital for our scientific division of labour.
Nevertheless, we are led astray if we forget its operational implications.
V. Scientifically Shaped Experience versus Primordial Experience:
the Representationalist Predicament
The latency of neural processes implied in Metzinger’s PT cannot be con-
ceived of as a structure of experience. There is no subject for whom the
processes in question could be made explicit as structuring her experience.
The brain (or: the limbic system) does not constitute a self in any relevant
theoretical or practical sense. It cannot constitute a self because this re-
quires meaningful, i.e. semantically interpreted experiences that involve
reference to (hierarchies of) wants, desires, values, interests, and so on.
The mere running off of neural processes does not constitute experience.
The processes occurring in my brain are not part of my experience (cf.
Husserl 1952a, pp. 164, 218, 230–231; Ricoeur 1996, p. 164). IT and HAT
call for self-application. Every cognitive scientist who investigates the hu-
man mind, and thereby performs particular intentional experiences, too,
must be subject to IT and HAT. She has to consider herself as a brain that
interprets informational data realized in some mind whose »true agent« is
a brain. From this point of view it may become common to talk about
brain-to-brain communications in cognitive science. Arguing like this, how-
ever, involves a categorical mistake. Neural processes do not think, com-
municate, regret their moral imperfection or enjoy some magical erotic
moments.
If there are electrodes fixed to my head which transmit the occurrences in
my brain to a recorder that simultaneously visualises them, it does not fol-
low that I am, in any strict or interesting sense, able to experience my own
brain. Methodically disciplined modes of experience which are operative in
variable experimental designs must not be confused with our ordinary ex-
perience (cf. Heidegger 1996, pp. 188, 196–197). Metzinger naturalizes pri-
mordial experience by supposing that first-person perspective and third-per-
son perspective are equivalent attitudes which can be changed arbitrarily ac-
cording to different objectives (Rinofner-Kreidl 2004). Consequently, we are
free to describe our mind from either an external point of view, i. e. as a
succession of neurological states, or an internal point of view, i. e. as the
experiences we go through (Metzinger 1996a, p. 256). Here again it is obvi-
ous that the naturalization of subjectivity which is expected to be the out-
come of Metzinger’s theory has been smuggled in from the outset (see sec-
tion III). It is implied in the basic concepts of his self-model and its mode
of questioning empirical data. Contrary to this, a phenomenologist insists
that any talk about »my brain« requires that I have an experience of my
own body involving a first-person perspective. Without this original bodily
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experience, I could never conceive of a succession of brain states as be-
longing to me. Taking first-person perspective and third-person perspecti-
ve on a par with one another, tacitly assumes that brains can be considered
self-sufficient entities whose contingent realization in human bodies, in-
cluding modes of behaviour which cannot be explained »bottom-up«, can
be neglected with a view to special theoretical purposes.
A functionalistic view, committed to the thesis of multi-realizability, cannot
do justice to our subjective experience of embodied mind. What it means
to leave aside the intrinsic »worldliness« of human consciousness can be
explained in relation to a diverse set of issues. Among these is the peculiar
weakening of the mind/body unity owing to a functionalistic view, i.e. the
displacement of our natural experience of embodiment. In a similar way,
the loss of world in Metzinger’s theorizing manifests itself as a total neglect
of intersubjectivity with a view to the constitution of self-reference and,
consequently, self-referentially based self-consciousness. Furthermore, Met-
zinger disregards our ability to grasp immediately the situational horizon of
whatever single experience we encounter. It has been rightly argued that
scientific models that take consciousness to consist in information process-
ing inevitably fail to consider the »enworlded« nature of consciousness.
This is due to the fact that it is impossible to transform our natural ability
of synthetically grasping more or less complex situations into some objec-
tive system of data by means of which one could exhaustibly specify the
concepts and rules to be applied in concrete cases (Dreyfus 1985, pp.
214–218). The belief that this can be done, applied to artificial intelligence,
could be called »computer-Cartesianism« (cf. Dreyfus 1985, p. 218). Equally,
we may talk about a »brain-Cartesianism« implicit in those cognitive scien-
tific theories which, due to their representationalism, adhere to a rigid du-
alism of outer reality and internal system of informational data (see the
discussion about our concept of the world in section VII). Both the exter-
nal and the internal eludes our natural experience.
From another point of view, the sterility of Metzinger’s theory concerning
the demands of intersubjectivity and situational embedding is due to the
complete lack of a practical dimension. Metzinger’s naturalistic theory of
self-modeling exclusively explains the emergence of phenomenal self-cons-
ciousness without taking into account the social dimension of subjectivity
(Metzinger 1999a, pp. 175, 225). This dimension is said to be negligible in-
sofar as the physical structures of data are deprived of any semantic con-
tent (Metzinger 1999a, p. 251 (fn. 10)). Notwithstanding this severe restric-
tion of his field of investigation, the author does not reckon with any loss of
sense with regard to his naturalized subjectivity. Generally, and quite ama-
zingly, it is expected that future research in the field of cognitive science
will succeed in incorporating intersubjectivity. And yet, how could one ex-
pect to adequately describe or explain subjectivity from a solipsistic point
of view and, later on, expand one’s concern to a social dimension conside-
red as a supplementary field of experience which is not, from the outset, in-
volved in the constitution of subjectivity?
Metzinger’s attempt to naturalize subjectivity is based on a reification of
consciousness. This reification results from eliminating the distinction of
actually living through experiences and being reflectively directed at one’s
experiences. The representationalism of Metzinger’s self-model theory does
not leave any room for referring to immediately present experiences. For
methodical reasons, Metzinger holds that what cannot be represented as
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conscious content on the neurophenomenological level of description is
not a relevant part of human experience. This assumption occasionally
turns up when Metzinger discusses the methodical implications involved in
the question of how philosophers and psychiatrists can cooperate in analys-
ing phenomena of identity disorder.
»’Personal identity’ can be either a complex theoretical concept or a concrete [form] of subjec-
tive experience, a conscious content – but it never is a thing, neither in the brain nor anywhere
else. To put the point differently: Psychiatrists must stop being naïve realists about personal
identity.« (Metzinger 2003f, p. 3, emphasis mine)
Here we have the tacit presupposition of Metzinger’s self-model: There are
no »formal« aspects of human experience which cannot be (neurophe-
nomenologically) represented as conscious contents. Depending on whe-
ther or not we agree to this general thesis, we achieve completely different
ideas of subjectivity. It is characteristic of a phenomenological approach to
deny the above thesis (Rinofner-Kreidl 2003b, pp. 215–221). The peculiar
character of subjectivity ultimately lies in the fact that there are »formal«
aspects of our experience which resist representational objectification on
whatever level of description. Metzinger holds that this is true with regard
to the phenomenal level of description, as it is interpreted in folk psychology,
but false with regard to the neurophenomenological level of description.
Consequently, a pivotal question of the naturalism debate is how different
levels of description are related to each other. However, talking about
»levels« of description is misleading. It wrongly suggests that what neuro-
phenomenologists and phenomenologists do is describe the same pheno-
mena from different points of view.
In relation to the superimposing structure of meta-representations, which
enables the system to re-interpret and overcome phenomenally transparent
states, we may summarize Metzinger’s account as follows. Experiences are
part of our cognitive life only if they have been transformed into or ac-
quired in terms of meta-representational contents. Contrary to this, a phe-
nomenological approach emphasizes the practical moment of accomplish-
ment (living through experiences). From a phenomenological point of view,
it is evident that Metzinger de-temporalizes our primordial self-conscious-
ness which is said to consist in a hierarchical structuring of contents by
means of meta-representations. It is interesting that Metzinger, vice versa,
accuses phenomenologists of eliminating the dynamic character of con-
sciousness (»phenomenological fallacy«: Metzinger 1999a, p. 161) by disre-
garding the neurological level of description. This objection results from
two assumptions which must be dismissed. First, the succession of occur-
rences in the brain is equated with the original temporality of conscious-
ness based on the subjective experience of before/after relations, which are
not yet interpreted in terms of objective time units. Second, the mediating
function of intentional contents is ignored (see above section III).
VI. Meta-theoretical Issues Involved
in the Naturalism Debate
Metzinger’s naturalization project revolves round the attempt to conceive
of subjectivity in terms of representational relations. Contrary to this, a
phenomenologist argues that representation cannot be considered the
most fundamental, original mode of consciousness. Given this essential dis-
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agreement concerning the idea of consciousness, the most basic question
seems to be whether cognitive scientists and phenomenologists actually re-
fer to the same phenomena or not. Do they explain the same phenomena
in incompatible ways or do they talk about different things? We obviously
cannot soothe this issue by arguing that the opponents talk about different
aspects of reality so that, in a certain sense, we might be satisfied with both
approaches. This does not do because our idea of reality is part of the is-
sue. If we follow Metzinger in conceiving of intentionality in terms of
causal roles, it is unclear how we could ever reach the idea that the world is
not the sum total of all things, and instead an encompassing meaning-
horizon without which we were unable to encounter things. It does not suf-
fice to consider the holistic character of reality (Metzinger 1995), if this ho-
lism, again, is interpreted according to the functionalistic approach of Met-
zinger’s »bottom-up« neurophenomenology. If we proceed from the scien-
tifically reduced, non-natural idea of the world which manifests itself in
Metzinger’s self-model theory, it may well be that we can describe how our
brains are related to a virtual or real world. Nevertheless, this does not say
anything about our natural experience of the world. It only shows that in
constructing theoretical models we are free to talk about a world or certain
aspects of reality. This is owing to the fact that the definition of »world« or
»reality« depends on internal criteria of the models in question. From this
point of view, the main concern of the naturalism debate is how we should
consider theoretical models to be related to our life-world practice. Can we
really leave it to some special scientific model to determine what »world«
or »reality« means? Or, must we rely on our primordial experience which
always operates on condition that we already have an understanding of
world and reality? Should we not acknowledge this fundamental status of
primordial experience, how, then, could we claim to critically assess different
models of reality resulting from different theoretical approaches? Geneti-
cally viewed, our natural understanding of the world is already involved if
we are told that to »have an ontology is to interpret a world« and that »the
brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world,
possesses an ontology, too.« (Metzinger 2003c, p. 549) In methodical
terms, this amounts to a
»… mathematical model describing the phenomenal ontology of the human brain – i.e. that
which exists according to conscious experience – in a precise and empirically plausible man-
ner.« (Metzinger 1995, p. 427).
If a phenomenologist advances the view, as I do, that representationalistic
theories distort or even eliminate those phenomena they claim to explain,
what then, should we think about the naturalism debate insofar as theories
of this kind are concerned? We certainly cannot expect that: a) scientific
methods are neutral with regard to the objects investigated, and that b) the
naturalism debate can be decided by comparing the efficiency of diverse
(scientific) methods of analysing and explaining phenomena. Every state-
ment concerning methodical efficiency tacitly implies some conception of
how our theorizing is related to the world as it presents itself in everyday
life. Applying methods always involves a certain structuring of its correlating
objects. This being the case, it is clear that the dispute between naturalists
and anti-naturalists cannot be settled at the level of describing and explain-
ing phenomena. To describe or explain phenomena and to discuss the me-
thodical and conceptual framework of our descriptions and explanations
are quite different activities which should be clearly distinguished. How-
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ever, the results of the former activity might turn out to be problematic due
to ignoring the difficulties brought to light by the latter. Both a) and b)
suggest that if we phenomenologically challenge projects of naturalizing
the human mind we have to focus on the issue of how theory and practice
are interrelated. Thus, asking on what theoretical grounds it might be possi-
ble to adequately discuss naturalizations of subjectivity is still insufficient if
it does not comprise a radical reflection on our idea of theory.
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Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Die Grenzen des Repräsentationalismus
Eine phänomenologische Kritik von Thomas Metzingers
Selbstmodell-Theorie
Die Theorie des Selbstmodells von Thomas Metzinger bietet einen Rahmen für die Naturalisierung
subjektiver Erfahrungen, d.h. der Ich-Perspektive. Diese Phänomene lassen sich erklären unter Be-
zug auf Repräsentierungsinhalte, die, so heißt es, auf verschiedenen Bewusstseinsebenen interrela-
tional und mit Gehirnaktivitäten korrelierend sind. Der Artikel beginnt mit der Ergründung von
Naturalismus und Anti-Naturalismus als Skizze für den Hintergrund der Metzingerschen Behaupt-
ung, seine Theorie befinde philosophische Spekulierungen über den Geist für nicht notwendig (I).
Insbesondere wird Husserls phänomenologischer Bewusstseinsbegriff als unkritisch und unange-
bracht verworfen. Es wird sich herausstellen, dass diese Kritik falsch gerichtet war (II). Die Haupt-
mängel der Metzingerschen Theorie werden durch Referieren auf den Begriff der phänomenalen
Transparenz beleuchtet (III), die mit der phänomenologischen Idee der Transparenz verglichen
werden soll. Dann wollen wir unseren kritischen Horizont erweitern, indem wir einige Implikatio-
nen des Repräsentationalismus fokussieren werden, einschließlich der Reifizierung des Bewusstseins,
des Gehirn-Cartesianismus und des Ausschlusses der sozialen Dimension (V). Schliesslich wollen
wir unsere metatheoretischen Reflexionen auf die Naturalismusdebatte übertragen (VI).
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Les limites du représentationnalisme
Critique phénoménologique de la théorie
du moi modèle de Thomas Metzinger
La théorie du moi modèle de Thomas Metzinger offre comme cadre de naturalisation d’expéri-
ences subjectives le point de vue de la première personne. Ces phénomènes sont expliqués par réfé-
rence aux contenus représentationnels, considérés comme corrélationnels à différents niveaux de
la conscience et corrélatifs aux activités cérébrales. L’article commence par des observations au
sujet du naturalisme et de l’anti-naturalisme en vue d’esquisser à grands traits les fondements des
assertions de Metzinger selon lesquelles sa théorie rend superflues les spéculations philosophiques
sur l’intellect (I). En particulier, le rejet de la conception phénoménologique de la conscience de
Husserl comme inappropriée est peu fondée. L’article démontre que cette critique va dans est peu
judicieuse (II). Les principaux défauts de la théorie de Metzinger y sont mis au clair par référence
à la conception de transparence phénoménale (III), qui est comparée à l’idée phénoménologique
de transparence (IV). C’est alors que nous y élargissons notre horizon critique en prêtant une at-
tention particulière à certaines implications du représentationnalisme, y compris la réification de
la conscience, le cartésianisme cérébral et l’exclusion de la dimension sociale (V). Finalement,
nous appliquons nos réflexions métathéoriques sur la discussion au sujet du naturalisme (VI).
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